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Abstract:  If participation in the labour market helps to secure women's outside options 
in the case of divorce/separation, an increase in the perceived risk of marital dissolution 
may accelerate the increase in female labour supply. This simple prediction has been 
tested in the literature using time and/or spatial variation in divorce legislation (e.g., 
across US states), leading to mixed results. In this paper, we suggest testing this 
hypothesis by exploiting a more radical policy change, i.e., the legalization of divorce. In 
Ireland, the right to divorce was introduced in 1996, followed by an acceleration of 
marriage breakdown rates. We use this fundamental change in the Irish society as a 
natural experiment. We follow a difference-in-difference approach, using families for 
whom the dissolution risk is small as a control group. Our results suggest that the 
legalization of divorce contributed to a significant increase in female labour supply, 
mostly at the extensive margin. Results are not driven by selection and are robust to 
several specification checks, including the introduction of household fixed effects and an 
improved match between control and treatment groups using propensity score 
reweighting. 
 
Key Words : divorce law, natural experiment, labour supply, fixed effects, propensity score. 
Corresponding Author: olivier.bargain@ucd.ie 
   
Acknowledgements : Bargain is affiliated to University College Dublin (UCD), the Geary Institute and IZA. González 
is affiliated to the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Keane is affiliated to UCD and the ESRI. Özcan is affiliated to Yale 
University. We are grateful to participants at IZA and ESRI seminars for useful advice. 
 
ESRI working papers represent un-refereed work-in-progress by researchers who are solely responsible for the 
content and any views expressed therein. Any comments on these papers will be welcome and should be sent to the 
author(s) by email. Papers may be downloaded for personal use only.  
  2 
 
Introduction 
If participation in the labour market helps to secure women's outside options in the case 
of divorce/separation, an increase in the perceived risk of marital dissolution can be 
expected to accelerate the increase in female labour supply. This simple prediction has 
been tested in the literature, notably by using cross-sectional variation in divorce laws 
(e.g. across US states). In this paper, we suggest exploiting an even more radical change, 
the mere legalization of divorce, in order to test this hypothesis. 
 
The right to divorce was introduced in Ireland in 1996. We first show that divorce 
legalization was followed by a sharp increase in marital breakdown rates (including both 
separations and newly allowed divorces). Then we use this fundamental change in the 
Irish society as a natural experiment.1 Following a difference-in-difference approach, we 
focus on the effect of divorce legalization on female labour supply within intact couples. 
To account for other possible factors affecting labour supply over the period, we use 
families at a "low risk" of marital breakdown as a control group. The separation/divorce 
risk is proxied by a measure of religiosity based on church attendance or, alternatively, a 
direct estimation of the individual-specific probability of marital breakdown, i.e., a 
flexible function of individual characteristics and information on religiosity. We use the 
Living in Ireland Survey, which spans from 1994 to 2001 and hence provides data pre 
and post divorce legalization. 
 
We show that female labour supply significantly increased as a result of the exogenous 
increase in the risk of marital dissolution, and that this response occurred mainly at the 
extensive margin. Thus, building outside options seems to depend crucially on keeping 
some attachment to the labour market. Results are robust to different specification checks. 
In particular, differences between the treatment and control groups are addressed by 
propensity score reweighting. Also, since non-random attrition from the survey may 
                                                 
 
 
1 González and Özcan (2008) use the same reform to examine the impact of the risk of divorce on the 
savings behaviour of married couples in Ireland. 
cause a selection issue, we account for (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity by 
estimating a household fixed-effects model. Further results show that increased female 
labour supply was not compensated by either a decrease in domestic time spent on 
childcare or an increase in childrearing by fathers. There is no compelling evidence that 
male labour supply has increased with divorce risk. Hence our results suggest that a 
decrease in specialization within households did not necessarily occur and that women 
who secured their outside options by increasing labour market participation may have 
done so, at least in the short-run, at the expense of their leisure time and welfare. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature while 
section 3 presents the institutional background. Section 4 describes the empirical 
approach, the data and the definition of the control groups. Section 5 presents the main 
results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
Literature 
The impact of divorce laws has received a lot of attention. The first type of question 
studied in the literature was how divorce laws affect divorce rates, and notably the impact 
of unilateral divorce, which fundamentally changes the nature of the marriage contract by 
allowing either party to end it at will. Several authors have exploited time and/or spatial 
variation in legislation but evidence is mixed. Peters (1986, 1992), using a cross-section 
of data on women, finds no effect. Allen (1992) and Friedberg (1998) obtain the opposite 
result using an alternative model specification and panel data recording all the divorces 
by state and year respectively. Wolfer (2006) finds only a small long run effect of 
unilateral divorce regulations. González and Viitanen (2009) exploit time and cross-
country variations in Europe and find that unilateral divorce had a sizeable effect on the 
divorce rate. 
 
Closer to our concern, the literature has also examined the impact of divorce legislation 
on household behaviour. Precisely, legal reforms leading to "easier divorce" and 
subsequent increases in divorce rates are suspected to affect the perceived risk of marital 
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dissolution and therefore, potentially, household decisions2. In particular, specialization 
within households may have declined and female labour supply increased3. Previous 
evidence tends to confirm this hypothesis. Using cross-sectional comparisons, Peters 
(1986) and Parkman (1992) suggest that unilateral divorce led to a two percentage point 
rise in female labour force participation in the US. These results were argued to be 
erroneous in Gray (1998) who found that unilateral divorce laws had very different 
effects depending on the underlying property division laws. Stevenson (2008) revisits the 
question by taking a long run perspective and adding important controls that were 
missing in previous studies. She finds that women seeking both insurance against divorce 
and greater bargaining power within the marriage are more likely to engage in market 
work when states allow unilateral divorce, irrespective of the underlying property 
division laws. 
 
The direction of the relationship between women's work and divorce is ambiguous. The 
rise in women's labour force participation is often seen as responsible for increasing 
divorce rates (Becker, 1981). However, recent evidence points to the effect emphasized 
in the present paper. That is, women may take up a job as a form of insurance in case of 
divorce, or in anticipation of divorce. Evidence of anticipatory behaviour has been found 
in sociological studies (see for instance Poortman, 2005). Recent economic studies also 
                                                 
 
 
2 Several important outcomes have received some attention. Unilateral divorce laws have been shown to 
decrease domestic violence, spousal homicide, and suicide (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006), to affect fertility 
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2007) and marriage specific investments (Stevenson, 2007). Divorce also seems to 
have long-term adverse effects on children (Gruber 2004, González and Viitanen, 2008). Chiappori et al. 
(2002) find substantial evidence of a change in intrahousehold bargaining associated with a change in the 
laws. 
3 The traditional division of labor between husbands and wives is commonly argued to be an important gain 
associated with marriage. Spouses efficiently concentrate on activities in which each of them has a relative 
advantage so that family utility is maximized (Becker, 1973). The supposed female comparative advantage 
in domestic production is often attributed to the gender gap in market wages and - less consensually - to a 
productivity advantage in household activities (such as childcare). However, couples can engage in an 
efficient degree of specialization only if the relationship is stable and the working spouse can commit to 
compensate the partner in charge of domestic production. In effect, moving from cohabitation to marriage 
may lead to increased specialization, as shown by El Lahga and Moreau (2007). Inversely, an increase in 
the perceived risk of marital breakdown - or the mere possibility to divorce - makes intertemporal 
commitment more problematic and is likely to reduce the level of specialization within marriage. Indeed, 
spouses who specialize in home production may be disadvantaged in the case of a  divorce compared with 
their partners, and may want to secure their outside options by increasing labor market participation (see 
Lundberg, 2002, for an enlightening discussion). 
stress the importance of this effect. Using the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), Johnson and Skinner (1986) showed that, while the effect of wives' labour 
market participation on the divorce risk is insignificant, a rising probability of divorce 
faced by married women increases their labour supply, whether they ultimately separate 
or not. They estimate that up to one-third of the unexplained increase in female labour 
market participation in the U.S. between 1960--1980, a period during which divorce rates 
doubled, may be attributed to this effect. Lundberg and Rose (1999) also used the PSID 
and found that a higher divorce risk is associated with decreased specialization. Gray 
(1995) found that women's labour force participation increased two to three years prior to 
divorce.4 
 
In this paper, we analyze the effect of an arguably stronger shock to the risk of divorce 
than the introduction of unilateral divorce: the legalization of divorce in a setting where it 
was previously banned. We show that the legalization was followed by higher rates of 
marital breakdown, and exploit the heterogeneity in the risk of divorce across the 
population to analyze the effect of the reform on the labour supply of married women. 
We also consider the effect on men's labour supply, which has received less attention and 
for which the existing evidence is mixed. Among these studies, Kapan (2008) finds no 
change in husbands' labour supply in response to changes in the divorce law in the UK. 
Chiappori et al. (2002) argue that men would increase their labour supply only if the laws 
favour them, while Mueller (2005) finds an increase in the work hours of Canadian men 
in anticipation of divorce. 
                                                 
 
 
4Further evidence is provided by alternative methodologies. Papps (2006) calculated divorce 
probability using a Cox proportional hazard model and data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth 1979 and found that married women work more when they face a higher probability of 
divorce. Using aggregated time series data, Bremmer and Kesselring (2004) found that an 
increase in the divorce rate results in a long-run increase in the participation rate. Note also that 
Sen (2000) found different patterns for older and younger cohorts. In the former, women who 
foresaw a high probability of divorce were likely to work more than their low divorce-risk 
counterparts; in the latter, labour supply patterns for high and low divorce-risk women were 
relatively similar. 
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Institutional Background 
The Republic of Ireland was one of the last Western countries not to have any legal 
provision for divorce, the Irish Constitution of 1937 having put a ban on the dissolution 
of marriage. A referendum on the subject took place in 1986 in which two-third of the 
electorate rejected a change in the law. In the wake of the referendum, however, legal 
separation was introduced5; by 1995, 75,000 Irish couples had become legally separated. 
On 25 November 1995, the question was again put to the Irish electorate. At the 
beginning of the referendum campaign opinion polls suggested that there would be a 
clear, if not comfortable, majority in favour of divorce. The margin declined as polling 
day approached and in the last month before the referendum, the Irish Government placed 
advertisements in favour of a yes vote in a large number of national and regional 
newspapers. The result was a very narrow majority (50.28 percent) in favour of the 
legislation of divorce. The turnout of eligible voters was 61.9 per cent compared to 59.6  
per cent in the June 1986 referendum on the same issue. The narrowness of the 1995 vote 
necessitated a recount (Irish Times, 1995). Based on these facts, we argue that the result 
of the referendum was largely unexpected and that the introduction of divorce was 
unanticipated prior to November 1995. 
 
The removal of the ban was incorporated into the Constitution in June 1996, and the new 
divorce law became effective in February 1997. Divorce in Ireland is not unilateral, i.e., 
even if the separation requirement is met a divorce is not automatically granted if one of 
the partners is opposed. The economic consequences of divorce for the spouses are 
broadly at the discretion of the courts. The law states the factors to be taken into 
consideration, including the contributions made by the two spouses (both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary), but there is no explicit policy of equal division of assets. The calculation 
of actual maintenance payments is up for the courts to decide and is based on the 
financial resources and needs of the spouses. 
                                                 
 
 
5Judicial separation was possible since 1989. An application can be made in case of adultery or if 
the spouses have lived apart or have not had a normal marital relationship for at least one year. 
 
 
 The top panel of Figure trend shows the trend in the number of divorces and judicial 
separations since the late 1980s according to Census data. Obviously the number of 
divorces granted rose sharply immediately after it came in to law in 1997. This could 
simply be a reflection of a `backlog' being cleared, i.e., separated couples who wished to 
divorce prior to 1996 were now availing of divorce as it became legally possible. 
Nonetheless, the number of separated persons did not decrease - even if it progressed less 
rapidly in the second half of the 1990s than in the first half, as some substitution with 
divorce may have occurred. The important aspect for our purpose is that the legalization 
of divorce increased the overall rate of marital dissolution (divorces, separations and 
remarriages).6 Figure trend (top panel) confirms that the stock of broken marriages rose 
sharply from around 40,000 in 1986 to 200,000 twenty years later, and that the 
progression is much more rapid following the legalization of divorce.7 We show in what 
follows that these average figures hide contrasted patterns for different subgroups of the 
population. 
Empirical Strategy 
Difference-in-Difference Approach 
The possibility of divorce and a rising rate of marital breakdown may encourage married 
women to increase their labour market participation and strengthen their outside options. 
We test this simple prediction using a difference-in-difference approach. Denote Yi the 
                                                 
 
 
6It is noticeable that the number of separations had already started to increase prior to divorce 
legalization. Several authors discuss how the rise in divorce rates can occur before the 
introduction of new divorce laws due to a prior change in social norms (Fella et al., 2004, Allen, 
1998, Hiller and Recoules, 2009). 
 
 
7The number of married people is also rising over the period but not to the extent as to negate the 
increase in marital breakdown. According to Census information, a ratio of 14:1 married people to 
separated/divorced people existed in 1996. This ratio had dropped to 9:1 by 2002 and fell again 
to 8:1 by 2006. Note also that the legalization of divorce did not absorb previous marriage 
annulments (the annulment rate remained very small, around the 1% mark, over the whole period 
under consideration). 
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outcome of interest for household i, and Xi a vector of controls. The sample comprises of 
married couples observed in the pre-divorce period (Posti = 0) as well as following the 
introduction of divorce (Posti = 1). The variable Treati denotes the intensity of treatment 
for household i, i.e., the degree of exposure to an increased risk of marital breakdown. As 
discussed in detail below, it is proxied by either the degree of non-religiosity or a direct, 
individual-level estimation of the probability of separation/divorce. When using 
religiosity as a binary variable, with Treat = 0 for a religious household (control group) 
and 1 otherwise (treatment group), the estimation goes as follows: 
     
 
In the case of a binary treatment, the interpretation is standard. That is, α captures the 
time trend, i.e., the average difference in outcome   between the pre- and post-treatment 
periods, as identified on the non-treated; β captures the average difference in outcome 
between the treated and the non-treated; γ is the coefficient of interest, i.e., the difference-
in-difference estimator. Covariates X may improve the precision of the model but also 
control for the differences in observables between treated and control groups. Note that 
the treatment effect γ may be (wrongly) driven by differing trends in observables between 
the treated and control groups as captured by the Treati variable. We purge the estimation 
of this effect by introducing interactions between the Post variable and the controls X.8 
 
The main outcome Yi is married women's labour supply as a continuous variable, i.e., 
their weekly work hours, so that model (1) can be estimated by OLS. We consider two 
cases, with or without zeros, in order to verify if divorce had an effect at both the 
extensive and the intensive margin. Also, the participation decision can be estimated by a 
linear probability model, to ease the interpretation of the coefficients in difference-in-
                                                 
 
 
8At this stage, we ignore the panel dimension and cluster standard errors at the individual level 
when estimating model (1) on data pooled over a number of years (see section 4.2). Accounting 
for selection on observables only and doing so in a linear way may not be enough. To improve on 
both accounts, we shall also allow for (time-invariant) unobservables using panel information and 
perform propensity score reweighting (see section 5.2). 
 
 
(1) 
difference analyses, or by a logit model in which (1) represents the propensity to 
participate in the labour market. We also consider male labour supply in the last section, 
as well as time spent on childcare by both husbands and wives. Below, we present the 
data and discuss in detail two essential dimensions that may crucially affect the results: 
the definition of the pre and post-treatment periods and the choice of the control group. 
Data 
Our core results are based on samples drawn from the Living in Ireland Survey (LII). 
This is a longitudinal survey that was conducted on an annual basis between 1994 and 
2001. It is based on a representative sample of the Irish population and contains 
information on demographics, work duration, social situation, living standards and 
financial circumstances of Irish families. The original sample consisted of just over  
  households and nearly    individuals per year. For the main difference-in-
difference estimations, we use (separately) the subsamples of married women and 
married men. Since the legalization of divorce may well affect the incentives to marry, 
we exclude couples whose marriages took place in 1996 or later in order to avoid 
potential selection into marriage effects (   observations). Since retirement decisions 
may interfere with the labour supply response that we aim to capture, we exclude couples 
above 60 (   of the initial sample). 
Additionally, we use a sample of separated/divorced individuals together with married 
people to estimate the probability of divorce, as explained below. We also use the Irish 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) for one of our robustness checks. The HBS is carried 
out at five-year intervals and contains information on household income sources and 
expenditure as well as demographic and socio-economic variables. The sample size is 
around    households for each wave and the most recent data available are for the 
years 1987, 1994, 1999 and 2005. 
Sensitivity to Timing 
The definition of pre- and post-treatment periods may crucially affect the results and 
necessitates an extensive sensitivity check. For the main difference-in-difference analysis 
using the LII, we pool years 1994 and 1995 (until referendum day, the 25th of November 
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1995) to obtain the pre-divorce group. We make use of different post-divorce 
introduction periods. Once people knew that divorce was going to be introduced 
presently, they might have adjusted their behaviour there and then. Hence the first "post" 
group is simply obtained by pooling observations from voting day until 2001. Since the 
first Irish divorce was passed in 1997 -- with substantial media coverage -- we use the 
period 1997-2001 as an alternative "post" group. As one may argue that it took time for 
the increased rate of divorce/separation to affect the perceived risk of marital breakdown, 
we also use a later period 1998-2001. 
We also provide a "check" difference-in-difference estimation based on pre- and post-
periods which do not surround the legalization of divorce, namely 1998-99 and 2000-01. 
This can be seen as a `placebo' test, the aim of which is to verify whether the approach 
may be picking up a general trend rather than the effect of divorce introduction. 
A specific issue is related to the fact that    households were added to the survey in 
2000 because of some attrition over the life of the survey and to ensure that a 
representative sample was maintained. There may be bias in the original sample because 
of attrition, but the refreshment sample may also cause bias because of possible 
differences from the original sample. The fixed effects estimation presented below is a 
partial check on that issue. We also present results both with and without the refreshment 
sample for years 2000-2001. 
Finally, when using the HBS, we simply choose the two available waves which most 
closely surround divorce legalization (1994 and 1999) and compare with LII estimations 
based on the very same years. 
Control Groups 
We suggest control groups that are subject to similar economic conditions as the treated 
but did not experience, or were much less affected by, the increase in the perceived risk 
of divorce following the law change. Firstly, we identify the risk of marital dissolution 
using the degree of religiosity (see also González and Özcan, 2008). We then carry out a 
direct, individual-level estimation of the risk of marital breakdown using the LII survey 
and a number of covariates.9 
 
Religiosity 
 
While most European countries had a legislative basis for divorce from the first half of 
the 20th century, three countries had a ban on divorce in place until relatively recently: 
Italy (divorce was legalized in 1970), Spain (1981) and Ireland (1996). These three 
countries are also predominantly Roman Catholic.10 Since divorce is banned by the 
Catholic Church, it is plausible to think that religious couples would be less responsive to 
the legalization of divorce. Our first treatment variable therefore relies on proxies for the 
degree of (non-)religiosity. 
Studies on the economics of religion typically use church attendance as a measure of 
religiosity at the individual level when self-reported religiosity is not available, as it is the 
case in our data (Iannaccone, 1998). In the LII survey, respondents are asked `Apart from 
weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services?'. 
The response takes a value of between 1 (attends religious services more than once a 
week) and 7 (never attends religious services).11 For the main results, we use the answer 
either as a continuous variable ( Treat  is increasing with the degree of non-religiosity) or 
as binary, where the control group (Treat=0 ) is composed of households where the wife 
                                                 
 
 
9Note that we refrain from using single individuals as a control group for several reasons. Firstly, 
there is possibly an important lack of "common support" between the two groups (especially with 
respect to age). Also, the labour supply behaviour of singles is fundamentally different from the 
joint decision of partners in a couple. In our data, labour supply patterns of the two groups are 
very different, not only in level but also in trend. Finally, even though evidence for Ireland does 
not point to a radical change in the marriage rate, the decision to marry is potentially affected by 
the legalization of divorce (since there is a change in the value of marriage). 
 
10 In Ireland, out of 21,355 marriages in 2005, 74.3% were celebrated as a Catholic marriage, 
3.4% under other religious denominations (93% of which were Church of Ireland or Presbyterian) 
and 22.3% as civil marriages. 
 
 
11There is very little variation in reported church attendance over time but we nonetheless fix the 
response to this question equal to the response given the first time the individual appears in the 
survey. 
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attends church at least once a week. This threshold is found to be the relevant one as 
discussed in the estimations of the risk of marital breakdown below. 
 
As in González and Özcan (2008), we believe that this is a robust control group for the 
difference-in-difference estimation. Firstly, and most importantly, there is clear evidence 
that "religious women", so defined, do have a much lower rate of marital dissolution 
(around 4 times less than non-religious couples prior to divorce legalization and around 6 
times less by the end of the 1990s). This can be seen in the lower panel of Figure trend 
where we plot the rates of separation and marital breakdown (separations plus divorces) 
for religious and non-religious households. We also point to the fact that religious 
couples were not affected by the new law: the rate of separation remains constant and the 
number of actual divorces is marginal. Secondly, we do not believe that church 
attendance reflects only a compliance with social norms in such a religious country as 
Ireland. The 2002 European Social Survey asks about both church attendance and self-
reported religiosity (on a scale from 0 to 10). Around    of those who attend church 
at least once a week also report to be religious or very religious (values 5-10), versus  
  for those who attend less than once a week.12 Finally, church attendance typically 
occurs at times where it does not interfere with work choices (Saturday evenings, Sunday 
mornings), and hence should not conflict with our estimates of female labour supply. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to check for potential differences between religious and non-
religious women. This is taken care of by the inclusion of  Xi  and  Posti  x X i  interactions 
terms in the regression. Moreover, we focus on married couples and may have to account 
also for spouses' religiosity. Clearly, the main treatment, as defined above, uses own 
religiosity, i.e., we use the church attendance of the wives (husbands) in the regressions 
on female (male) labour supply/participation. Yet we have also experimented with 
alternative measures based on both spouses' church attendance (e.g.,  Treat = 0  if both 
                                                 
 
 
12Inversely, among those who report to be very religious (values 8, 9 or 10),    also report 
attending church at least once a week. 
 
 
attend at least once a week) or constructed as a religiosity "score" based on both spouses' 
answers, as explained in the sub-section on robustness checks. 
In addition, we use another question from the LII survey concerning confidence in the 
church (answers are 1-great deal, 2-quite a lot, 3-not very much and 4-none at all) and the 
amount of donations to the church reported in the HBS (and calculated as a proportion of 
household total disposable income). Contrary to the question on church attendance, it is 
difficult to decide on a cut-off to create a binary treatment, so we simply use the level of 
donation as a continuous proxy for religiosity. Only for the purpose of reporting 
descriptive statistics (see below) do we create a binary variable where religious 
households are defined as those with positive amounts of donation to the church. 
 
Risk of Marital Breakdown 
 
The control groups previously defined require some assumptions, for instance the choice 
of a threshold for the binary variable, the cardinality assumption when using religiosity in 
a continuous way or the definition of particular scores. Alternatively, we can estimate and 
predict directly the individual probability of marital breakdown using church attendance 
and other controls, then use it as a continuous variable for the risk of marital dissolution ( 
 ) in the difference-in-difference estimation. This way, we "let the data speak" 
about the influence of the different church attendance levels on the propensity of marital 
breakdown. To do so, we run a probit regression on the sample of all women (married, 
separated or divorced) where the dependent variable takes a value of one if a woman is 
separated/divorced. 
Estimates and marginal effects are reported in Table 1. The first specification includes a 
single dummy for religiosity and shows that attending church at least once a week is 
associated with a smaller risk of being divorced/separated. The magnitude (   
percentage points) reduces the probability of being divorced/separated to almost zero 
compared to the average predicted probability for married women. The second estimation 
uses the complete set of dummies for the different answers to the church attendance 
question and is used to predict divorce probability for married women hereafter. Results 
with this flexible specification show that church attendance less than once a week 
  14 
increases significantly the probability of marital breakdown ("more than once a week" is 
the omitted category and the coefficient for "once a week" is not significant). This lends 
support to our choice of "at least once a week" as the relevant cutoff for the binary 
treatment variable previously defined.13 
Descriptive Statistics 
Before turning to the estimation results, we report the descriptive statistics of our sample 
of married women in Table 2. We first describe our full LII sample, then present statistics 
for both LII and HBS for the only two years available in the HBS (1994 and 1999). We 
distinguish between religious and non-religious couples using the church attendance 
definition (`at least once a week') for the LII, and using positive donations for the HBS. 
Interestingly, the two definitions give relatively similar proportions of religious families 
(76%  and  72%  in LII and HBS respectively, for the pre-divorce legalization period). 
Note that the proportion of religious persons is larger than the proportion of voters 
against divorce legalization, but religious people may well accept that others need to 
divorce. 
 
Not surprisingly, both LII and HBS datasets show that religious couples are older, with 
less children (perhaps due to the difference in age structure), more highly concentrated in 
rural areas and have less university degree qualifications. The most likely reason for these 
differences is a cohort effect. Table 2 shows that religious women work less than non-
religious ones in general. Again, this may reflect the slightly older makeup of religious 
women. Importantly, our estimations control for characteristics such as age and education 
in    and    terms. In section 5.2, we control more specifically for the 
                                                 
 
 
13Other controls show that age has an inversed U-shape effect on the risk of divorce/separation 
while the presence of young children and the number of children decrease it. Urban dwellers, 
those with low educational levels or with university degrees are more at risk. A third specification 
(not reported) includes political views but does not improve the fit much. It only shows that those 
close to the Workers' Party are also more at risk. A limitation of these estimations is that for those 
who are divorced or separated, information on their previous marriage is not available. That is, we 
cannot use information on their former husband (e.g., their religiosity, the age gap, etc.) or 
marriage (age at marriage, length of marriage, etc.). 
 
 
(observed) differences between treatment and control groups using propensity score 
reweighting. Notice that both religious and non-religious women increased their labour 
supply over the time period in question, which translates secular trend in increased 
participation and the more specific context of the "Celtic tiger" economic upturn. The 
important observation is that non-religious women have increased their participation by a 
greater extent, i.e., we find a crude effect of around 5 points when using the whole LII 
sample to compare pre- and post-divorce legalization (see Table 2). This can be 
visualized clearly in Figure trends, where the time trends in female labour market 
participation is depicted by religiosity group. Both groups show an increasing trend but 
the rise is more rapid for non-religious women. This is very suggestive of a positive 
effect of divorce legalization on the participation rate of women affected by the increased 
risk of marital breakdown. The rest of the paper aims to move beyond these average 
trends (and crude difference-in-difference measures) by controlling for individuals 
characteristics. 
Results 
Main Difference-in-Difference Estimations 
We firstly present our difference-in-difference estimations based on the LII survey and 
for the three main treatment variables as explained above: (1) a binary variable taking a 
value of 1 if the wife attends church at least once a week, (2) the continuous religiosity 
variable based on the wife's church attendance and (3) the continuous risk of separation 
as predicted using the LII data. Several other treatment options have also been 
experimented with and are discussed below. The alternative pre- and post-divorce 
introduction periods and the different outcomes are those defined in the previous section. 
In the various tables described below, we simply report the coefficient on the Post x 
Treat variable, i.e., the average treatment effect on the treated.14 The sign and 
                                                 
 
 
14The set of estimation tables for all the scenarios (different treatment definitions, pre and post 
periods definitions and outcomes) is not included due to lack of space but is available from the 
authors. Results are relatively standard concerning the determinants of female labour supply: the 
presence of young children and the number of children decrease female participation, as does 
the level of household income other than female labour income (capital income and husband's 
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significance of this coefficient    is indeed the relevant information for all the models at 
use, including the probit of participation.15 
 
Table 3 shows that coefficients are all significant for the participation model and for 
labour supply (work hours including zeros), for the four alternative "post" periods and the 
three main treatment variables. None of the estimates are significant for work hours 
excluding zeros. This indicates that the response to the introduction of divorce occurred 
at the extensive margin. That is, for those married women who already worked, there 
seem to be no significant response to the legalization of divorce. This provides an 
interesting insight into the bargaining mechanisms possibly at work within married 
couples. Precisely, what seems to matter for women who want to build up outside options 
is to keep some attachment to the labour market rather than to increase hours of work. 
Having a job, whether it is part- or full-time, may be enough to maintain human capital 
levels, access to a social network, access to a potential remarriage market, etc. Other 
studies, and in particular Johnson and Skinner (1988), confirm that women's increase in 
labour supply in anticipation of divorce is mostly on account of an increase in 
participation rather than in work hours. 
 
Several checks have been performed. We find that excluding the    interaction 
terms does not affect the estimates much (not reported). Also, omitting the refreshment 
sample (896 observations, 9% of our total sample) does not change the results 
fundamentally when 1997-2001 is used as the "post" period (see fourth rows in panels of 
table 3). Finally, it is reassuring to see that the coefficients obtained with our placebo test, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
earnings); participation increases with education levels and varies with age according to an 
inverted U-shape. The R2 (for OLS estimations) and pseudo-R2 (for logit estimations) are at 
conventional levels for the work hour equation (including zeros) and the participation model, but 
small for the estimation of work hours excluding zeros. 
 
 
15Concerns about the interpretation of interaction terms in non-linear models have been raised by 
Ai and Norton (2003). However, Puhani (2008) demonstrates that these concerns are not relevant 
for the treatment effect in non-linear difference-in-difference models. 
 
 
i.e., when the "pre" and "post" periods follow the divorce introduction, are not significant 
(see fifth and sixth rows in panels of table 3). This conveys that the effect is not due to 
general differences in labour supply trends between religious and non-religious women. 
 
We now look at the magnitude of the effect, first considering the participation model with 
treatment 1 (the binary variable for religiosity). When using a linear probability model, 
the effect is directly given by coefficient    (top left panel of table 3, first row), ranging 
within a narrow .07-.08 interval over the different "post" scenarios. We have also 
calculated the marginal (rather, incremental) effect when using a logit for participation 
(top right panel of table 3). In that case, the treatment effect is slightly larger, around .10, 
but does not vary significantly between the different timing scenarios.16 This means that, 
following the legalization of divorce, the participation rate of non-religious married 
women increased by around 10 percentage points, relative to religious married women. 
Expressed as a proportion of the average participation rate of non-religious women prior 
to divorce introduction (40%), this points to a 25% increase. Remaining with treatment 1, 
the coefficient for the work-hour model (including zeros) shows that post divorce 
introduction, the work duration of non-religious married women increased by around  2.2 
- 2.7 hours per week relative to religious married women (see bottom left panel of table 
3). Using treatment 3, we obtain coefficients of around 25 in the case of work hours (incl. 
zeros). Dividing these coefficients by 100 gives an intuitive interpretation: a one percent 
increase in the risk of marital breakdown leads to an increase in labour supply of around 
0.25 hours per week. It also leads to an increase in participation of around 1.1 points 
according to the logit model (top right panel of table 3) and .8 points according to the 
linear probability model (not reported). 
                                                 
 
 
16As said above, the concern raised by Ai and Norton (2003) does not apply here, and this effect 
can be calculated simply as the incremental effect of the coefficient    of the interaction term in 
the logit estimation (see Puhani, 2008). 
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Robustness Checks and Additional Results 
The results described in the previous sub-section convey that female labour supply 
amongst groups at a higher risk of divorce has significantly increased following the 
legalization of divorce in Ireland. We now suggest several robustness checks and 
additional results. 
 
Propensity Score Reweighting 
 
Descriptive statistics (Table 2) have shown that religious and non-religious women have 
relatively different characteristics, likely indicative of a cohort effect. We have accounted 
in a linear way for observed differences in  X, and how these characteristics affect labour 
supply in the post-divorce introduction period. It is possible, however, to use matching 
techniques to relax the linearity assumption and to check (or impose) common support. In 
the case where the treatment variable is binary (treatment 1 in our previous results), a 
simple approach consists in estimating the propensity of being treated and using the 
inverse propensity score to reweight the data. Denoting    as the 
estimated probability of treatment for observation   , we use the weights suggested by 
Firpo (2007) in a more general (non-linear) framework, that is    and    for 
non-treated and treated observations respectively.17 
According to Table 4, results are relatively robust to this sensitivity check in terms of 
significance. The inclusion of the X i and  Posti  x X i   interaction terms in our regressions 
was already quite successful in controlling for differences in characteristics between the 
treated and control groups. Yet we can observe that coefficients of the participation logit 
are slightly larger when reweighting is used, and so are the standard errors. The 
coefficients of the linear model in hours (including zeros) increase by around a third (a 
half for the first timing scenario). 
                                                 
 
 
17We have checked that the mean of each covariate in   , as well as the mean propensity score, 
is approximately equal across the treatment and control groups once these weights are used. 
 
 
 Selection and Fixed Effects Model 
 
A potential bias in the preceding results stems from the fact that we focus on married 
couples. Yet it is possible that the stock of marriages that survive post-1996 may not be 
comparable to the pre-1996 ones, as the "worst marriages" may drop out of our selected 
sample upon divorce introduction, particularly for the non-religious. To deal with this 
issue, we have replicated our estimations while excluding all women that are observed 
getting separated or divorced at any point during the survey -- that is, they are no longer 
in both our pre- and post-divorce samples. This excludes only    observations so that 
the results with the remaining "stable marriages" are not fundamentally different from the 
baseline estimates. In any case, this does not solve the problem of non-random attrition 
due to couples who disappear from the original dataset following a separation/divorce. 
 
A traditional way to deal with these issues is to estimate a fixed effects model using the panel information in the LII data. 
The new model is written as follows: 
     
 
with Zit a vector of time-varying control variables,    the individual fixed effect and    
an i.i.d. normally distributed stochastic term accounting for possible measurement error. 
As before, the coefficient    captures the potential effect of the increased risk of marital 
dissolution on the outcome for the treated. The dummy Postit  takes a value of 1 if 
household  i  is observed in year t which is posterior to the introduction of divorce, and  0  
otherwise. It is only introduced through interaction terms since the time trend is already 
accounted for in   . 
The selection problem would be solved if dropping those who separate/divorce post-1996 
is equivalent, for the labour supply estimation, to taking out a random subgroup; that is, if 
the residual    is not correlated with the propensity to separate/divorce. We control in a 
linear way for the observed characteristics that can affect this propensity (e.g., birth of a 
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child), and the fixed effects    may well capture time-invariant unobservables that are 
correlated with the divorce risk.18 A usual limit to this approach is that we ignore the 
possibility that time-varying unobservables (negative shocks like unemployment) affect 
both women's participation and their risk of divorce. We also estimate the fixed effects 
model where observations are reweighted by the inverse propensity score as explained 
above. According to Smith and Todd (2005), combining these two methods is more 
robust than traditional cross-section matching estimators, as it allows selection on 
observables as well as time-invariant selection on unobservables. 
 
In table 5, we compare the different models for work hours including zeros and for 
treatment 1. Reassuringly, the treatment effect is significant for the different timing 
scenarios and insignificant for the placebo check. The simple fixed effects model gives 
much smaller estimates, between 35% and 45% of what we previously found using the 
reweighted difference-in-difference model. Results are very stable when adding 
interaction terms and/or reweighting (again with the exception of the first timing 
scenario, which gives slightly larger effects). As before, standard errors increase when 
reweighting is used. In terms of work hours, the treatment effect is in the range 1.3-2 over 
the different models and timing scenarios. Similar estimations for the participation 
decision (not reported) give a participation effect around 4 percentage points, which 
corresponds to an increase of 10%  compared to the pre-divorce situation, to be compared 
to  10  points and  25% with the reweighted difference-in-difference model. 
 
Alternative Treatment/Control Groups and Datasets 
 
We have also checked that results are robust to the choice of the treatment variable. For 
instance, using the fixed-effects model with  Postit x Zit  interactions, we find that for all 
the "post" scenarios, the coefficient    is significantly positive for treatments 2 and 3 as 
                                                 
 
 
18For instance, the age at the beginning of the relationship (or the age at marriage), which is 
known to influence strongly the chances of marital breakdown and which is unfortunately not 
available in the data. 
 
 
previously defined, but also for alternative binary variables of religiosity (wife's 
attendance: more than once a week; both wife and husband attend once a week; both wife 
and husband attend more than once a week; both wife and husband have a high degree of 
confidence in the church) and several continuous variables (wife and husband's additive 
and multiplicative scores for church attendance; wife's confidence in the church; wife and 
husband's additive score for confidence in the church). 
 
A final robustness check is carried out using an alternative measure of religiosity based 
on donations to the church and drawn from the Household Budget Survey. Since the 
treatment in the LII analysis is the degree of non-religiosity (or the direct risk of marital 
breakdown), we compute the degree of non-religiosity in the HBS as either 1/exp (church 
donation) or (1- church donation), where church donation is expressed as a proportion of 
disposable income. Since the HBS only overlaps with the LII survey in years 1994 and 
1999, we replicate the results based on the LII for these two years only, in order to 
improve the comparison. Results of the difference-in-difference estimations are described 
in table 6. Both measures confirm that participation and work hours (incl. zeros) 
increased between 1994 and 1999 as a likely response to the increased risk of marital 
breakdown. 
 
Results for Men and Childcare Time 
 
While we expected the higher risk of divorce to increase married women's labour supply, 
the expected effect on men's is more ambiguous. Men may want to work less in order to 
reduce expected maintenance payments, but they may want to work more in anticipation 
of the costs of potential separation and divorce. 
 
We proceed with similar estimations on the labour supply of married men. The main 
findings are reported in table 7 for treatment 1 (using husband's church attendance) and 
work hours (including zeros). We find very weak evidence of an increase in male labour 
supply when using the difference-in-difference model with propensity score reweighting 
or the fixed effects model. Estimates of the treatment effect are significant for some, but 
not all, of the timing scenarios with the PS-reweighted fixed effects model. Yet the 
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magnitude of the effect varies extremely from one timing scenario to the other, and 
coefficients are also significant (and of a similar or larger magnitude) in the `placebo 
test', which casts serious doubt that what we are capturing here is the real effect of 
divorce laws on male labour supply. Results are similar when using either husband's or 
wife's attendance to the church. We conclude that the introduction of divorce did not 
increase married men's labour supply. 
 
Finally, we have checked that our main results do not change significantly when focusing 
on families with children. For these, we have also used LII information on time spent by 
married women and men on childcare. An issue is that the definition of this variable has 
changed, from a discrete choice ("less than 2 hours per day", "two to four hours", "more 
than an hour") in 1994 to the exact number of hours of childcare per week from 1995 data 
onwards. Since it was difficult to reconcile these two pieces of information into a 
consistent variable, we have rerun our estimations using the second definition and for the 
years 1995-2001 only, which reduced the number of observations prior to divorce 
legalization. Therefore, results are probably less robust than for labour supply 
estimations. We focus on households with children only. In these, the average childcare 
time by fathers is 9.5 hours per week in 1995 and 10 hours in 2001 while it is 
respectively 63 and 58 hours for mothers. The right panel of table 7 shows in fact that 
childcare time has not change significantly for men or women in response to divorce 
legalization. 
Conclusion 
This paper exploits the recent legalization of divorce in Ireland as a natural experiment to 
analyze the effect of an increase in the risk of marital breakdown on spousal labour 
supply. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that the exogenous shock to 
the risk of marital breakdown brought about by the reform is responsible for a significant 
increase in female labour supply. The effect is found to be especially strong at the 
extensive margin. In other words, it seems that the increased risk of divorce led women to 
acquire insurance against the potential negative shock of divorce by participating more in 
the labour market. 
 
We have shown that labour supply increased significantly also for the sub-group of 
women with children. It is tempting to go one step further and to suggest that divorce 
reduces specialization in marriage by accelerating the decline of traditional gender roles. 
However, additional evidence shows that time spent on childcare by men has not 
significantly increased while childrearing by women has not significantly decreased. 
Further research is needed to check if this conclusion extends to other domains within the 
sphere of domestic production. In other words, it is possible that domestic activities 
performed by wives, and hence the production of public goods within the household, 
have declined. It may also be the case that married women with children have seen an 
increase in their total working time (domestic and market work) with the reform, i.e., a 
decrease in pure leisure, and a possible loss in welfare. This would be partly compensated 
if men undertook more of the other domestic tasks or if women were compensated by a 
larger consumption share (see Browning and Gørtz, 2006, for direct evidence on 
individual expenditure, domestic and market work). It is unclear, however, whether 
legalizing divorce may have strengthened or weakened wives' bargaining position within 
the marriage.19 Further research could possibly evaluate the welfare effects of the reforms 
by using the subjective well-being information contained in the Living in Ireland Survey. 
In particular, it would be possible to follow Alessie et al. (2006) to recover the sharing 
rule consistent with spouses' individual welfare measures and check if the rule changed 
around the time of the reform. 
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Figure 1: Trend in Marital Breakdown (Census and LII) 
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Figure 2: Time Trend in Female Participation: Religious vs. Non-religious 
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 Table 1: Probability of Marital Breakdown: Estimates 
Coef. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Coef. Std. Err. Marg. Eff.
Age 0.13 0.04 *** .008 0.13 0.03 *** 0.008
Age2 / 1000 -1.45 0.38 *** -.084 -1.43 0.38 *** -0.083
Young chidren -0.17 0.10 * -.009 -0.18 0.10 * -0.009
No. of children < 18 -0.11 0.04 *** -.006 -0.11 0.04 *** -0.006
Urban 0.38 0.10 *** .022 0.38 0.10 *** 0.022
Religiosity (church attendance)
binary:
at least once a week -0.54 0.08 *** -.042
detailed categories:§
once a week -0.07 0.09 -0.004
>= once a month 0.30 0.12 ** 0.022
>= twice a year 0.42 0.14 *** 0.035
>= once a year 0.64 0.14 *** 0.066
once a year 0.68 0.18 *** 0.074
never 0.74 0.15 *** 0.081
Education §§
Some 2nd level, no exams -0.15 0.13 -.008 -0.15 0.13 -0.008
Group, Inter. and Junior Cert. -0.01 0.11 -.001 -0.01 0.11 -0.001
Leaving Cert./Matric -0.27 0.12 ** -.014 -0.25 0.12 ** -0.013
Diploma from University -0.35 0.17 ** -.015 -0.34 0.17 ** -0.015
Primary Degree -0.32 0.20 -.014 -0.33 0.20 * -0.014
Higher degree -0.31 0.21 -.014 -0.32 0.22 -0.014
Constant -3.48 0.78 *** -3.93 0.80 ***
No. obs
Pseudo-R2
§ Omitted variable: >once a week
§§ Omitted variable: no or primary educ.
Controls also include regions. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
0.173
15,682
0.181
15,682
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 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Married Women 
Pre-divorce legalization
Post
pre # post pre post pre # post pre post pre ## post pre post
Age 42.8 44.8 38.1 41.3 42.5 45.3 38.0 42.3 41.4 42.2 36.9 38.2
Hours (incl. zeros) 11.7 12.6 13.9 16.4 11.7 12.6 13.9 15.5 9.0 12.9 10.6 15.1
Participation rate (%) 0.35 0.41 0.40 0.51 0.34 0.42 0.39 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.53
Increase in participation 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.17
Crude diff-in-diff 0.05 0.02 0.03
# of Children <18 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.7
Pre School Child (%) 0.21 0.16 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.32 0.19 0.30 0.30 0.43 0.36
Urban (%) 0.44 0.41 0.70 0.68 0.45 0.40 0.71 0.68 0.55 0.38 0.73 0.64
Primary educ. (%) 16.7 13.8 16.8 15.7 16.9 12.7 16.8 18.3 20.1 12.0 24.8 13.0
Lower sec. educ (%) 37.9 36.9 36.4 36.9 38.2 35.9 35.4 38.4 31.7 30.1 31.3 30.3
High sec. educ (%) 34.1 36.3 30.6 29.6 33.6 36.9 30.7 27.8 41.3 45.8 34.8 41.4
University degree (%) 11.2 13.1 16.2 17.9 11.2 14.6 17.1 15.6 6.9 12.1 9.1 15.4
N 2,420 4,757 764 1,876 1,264 597 381 263 2171 1936 1324 1339
* Wife attends church at least once a week
** Household gives some positive donation to the church
Household Budget Surveys
Religious** Non religiousReligious* Non religious Religious* Non religious
Living in Ireland Surveys
1994
1999
1994 & 1995 until 25/11
1996 - 2001
1994
1999
 
 
Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Female Labour Supply  
Treatment: 1# 1 2 3 1 2 3
Pre Post
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 .07 *** .37 *** .20 *** 4.54 *** .09 *** .05 *** 1.09 ***
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 .08 *** .41 *** .21 *** 4.62 *** .10 *** .05 *** 1.10 ***
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 .08 *** .41 *** .21 *** 4.30 *** .10 *** .05 *** 1.03 ***
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ .08 *** .41 *** .22 *** 4.95 *** .10 *** .05 *** 1.16 ***
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 .00 .02 .01 -1.22 .00 .00 -.29
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ .05 .20 .11 1.60 .05 .03 .40
Range of R2 for the difference models:
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 2.62 *** 1.39 *** 25.19 *** .35 -.10 8.27
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 2.26 ** 1.15 ** 25.01 *** -1.25 -.71 3.26
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 2.23 ** 1.11 ** 25.51 *** -1.47 -.90 * 6.30
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ 2.39 ** 1.34 *** 26.21 *** -.85 -.36 .83
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 .63 .39 -2.64 1.59 .98 10.55
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ .98 .55 4.75 -1.37 -.97 -12.98
Range of R2 for the difference models:
Treatment:
1: religiosity dummy =1 if wife's church attendance is high (at least once a week) 
2: continuous religiosity variable based on wife's church attendance 
3: continuous risk of marital breakdown
(10.37)
(11.09)
(11.50)
(1.33) (0.74)
(0.51)
(1.20) (0.67)
(0.92)
0.06 to 0.08
(0.95) (6.03) (1.02) (0.59)(0.51)
(1.18) (10.53)(0.61) (7.82)
Participation (coefficient)
(0.03) (0.02)
(0.03) (0.02)
(0.03) (0.02)
(0.03) (0.02)
(0.09) (1.13)
(0.29)
(0.27)
(0.26)
(0.27)
(0.03) (0.02) (0.26)
(0.04) (0.02) (0.28)
Participation (marginal effect)
(1.14)(0.06)(0.12)
0.14 to 0.18
(0.13) (0.07) (1.13)
(0.12) (0.06) (1.11)
(0.12) (0.07) (1.10)
(0.12) (0.06) (1.22)
Standard erros in brackets. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. The participation model is estimated by logit, except first column indicated 
by # with coefficients from a linear probability model
(0.92) (0.52) (10.45)
Work hours (excl. zeros)
(1.00) (0.55) (10.22)
(0.89) (0.46) (5.92)
(5.97)(0.90) (0.47)
Work hours (incl. zeros)
(0.91) (0.47) (5.96)
(0.94) (0.50) (6.84)
0.15 to 0.17
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
@ excluding the refreshment sample for 2000-2001
(0.16)
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Table 4: D-in-D Estimates with Propensity Score Reweighting: Female Labour Supply 
Pre Post
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 .37 *** .45 *** .44 *** 2.62 *** 3.88 *** 3.84 ***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.91) (1.23) (1.21)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 .41 *** .45 *** .45 *** 2.26 ** 2.99 *** 2.93 ***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.89) (1.15) (1.14)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 .41 *** .48 *** .48 *** 2.23 ** 3.00 *** 2.97 ***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.90) (1.15) (1.15)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ .41 *** .46 *** .46 *** 2.39 ** 3.25 *** 3.20 ***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.95) (1.26) (1.23)
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 .02 .19 .18 .63 .14 .11
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.94) (1.44) (1.45)
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ .20 .27 .25 .98 1.11 1.08
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (1.18) (1.47) (1.45)
Treatment = 1 if wife's church attendance is high (at least once a week)
@ excluding the refreshment sample for 2000-2001
Reweighted Reweighted & interactions
Standard erros in brackets. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
Participation
Post x controls 
interactions
Hours (incl. zeros)
Post x controls 
interactions Reweighted
Reweighted & 
interactions
  
 
Table 5: Fixed-effects Estimates: Female Work Hours (incl. zeros) 
Pre Post
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 3.84 *** 1.35 *** 1.44 *** 1.90 *** 1.97 ***
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 2.93 *** 1.30 *** 1.35 *** 1.33 ** 1.38 **
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 2.97 *** 1.33 *** 1.42 *** 1.31 * 1.40 **
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ 3.20 *** 1.34 *** 1.39 *** 1.36 ** 1.41 **
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 .11 .94 1.07 .67 .61
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ 1.08 1.04 1.19 1.36 1.41
@ excluding the refreshment sample for 2000-2001
(0.64)
(0.70)
FE
(1.45)
DD, reweighted 
& interactions
(1.21)
(1.14)
(1.15)
(1.23)
(0.41)
(0.43)
(1.45)
(0.42) (0.57) (0.58)
FE, reweighted FE, reweighted & interactionsFE, interactions
(0.46) (0.64) (0.65)
(0.47)
(0.45)
(0.64)
(0.48) (0.67) (0.69)
(0.44) (0.63)
(0.66)
(0.72)
(0.83) (0.86)
(0.88) (0.91)
Std. errors in brackets. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. DD: difference in difference on pooled data. FE: fixed-effects 
estimations. Treatment = 1 if wife's church attendance is high (at least once a week).
 
  
Table 6: Comparison: Household Budget Survey and Living in Ireland Survey 
Participation 10.75 * 2.47 * .18 *
(5.49) (1.35) (0.09)
Hours (incl. zeros) 75.54 ** 17.07 ** 1.07 **
(33.02) (7.99) (0.54)
Hours (excl. zeros) 40.54 11.14 .27
(52.31) (12.70) (0.84)
A: 1 / exp(relative church donation)
B: 1 - (relative church donation)
C: wife's church attendance (scale 1-7, with 1 = very religious)
Note: in HBS, relative donation expressed in % of disposable income
(hence measures A and B are in a [0-1] range, with 0= very religious)
Pre: year 1994, Post: year 1999. Std. errors in brackets.  Level of significance: 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. Treatment (continuous var. for non- religiosity): 
CBA
Margin \ Treatment (Data)
(HBS) (HBS) (LII)
 
 
 Table 7: Additional Results 
Pre Post
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 1.62 .40 .92 1.54 -.03
(1.12) (0.49) (0.57) (1.99) (0.78)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 2.03 * .97 * 1.36 ** .81 -.41
(1.04) (0.52) (0.58) (2.03) (0.90)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 2.14 ** .86 1.30 ** .66 -1.53
(1.06) (0.57) (0.60) (2.21) (0.94)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ 1.62 .83 1.28 ** 1.00 -.46
(1.10) (0.55) (0.60) (2.06) (0.91)
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 2.40 * 2.27 *** 1.95 ** 2.80 .33
(1.29) (0.74) (0.82) (2.81) (1.99)
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ 1.87 2.07 ** 1.74 * 1.00 -.46
(1.40) (0.83) (0.90) (2.95) (2.17)
@ excluding the refreshment sample for 2000-2001
Men's Hours (incl. zeros)
DD, reweighting 
& interaction FE, interaction
Std. errors in brackets. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. DD: difference in difference on pooled data. FE: fixed-effects 
estimations. Treatment = 1 if church attendance is high (at least once a week). # = estimation on households with children only.
Weekly childcare # (FE, 
reweighting & interaction)
Women MenFE, reweighting & interaction
 
 
